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Chapter 2
Retirement Saving Adequacy and Individual
Investment Risk Management Using
the Asset/Salary Ratio
P. Brett Hammond and David P. Richardson
The defined contribution (DC) pension has become the dominant type of
retirement plan in the United States. Its widespread adoption has required
individuals to take more responsibility for lifetime financial security, and
has led to the development of many tools intended to help people manage
their retirement saving, investment, and income risks. These tools range
from expensive and highly customized advice to inexpensive target-date
maturity funds, automatic enrollment, and generic calculators, all intended
to encourage appropriate retirement saving, asset allocation, rebalancing,
and retirement income. Their purpose is to provide individuals with recom-
mendations on how much to save and what to do with that saving, and
implicitly, the notion is that if people follow those recommendations,
they will be more likely to have an adequate income stream in retirement.
In effect, the tools are intended to help them better manage their own
retirement income risk.
Despite the growth and popularity of such tools, rules of thumb, and
direct advice, it remains unclear as to what actually works well. Often
people fail to follow these ‘rules’ and experts’ recommendations, saving
too little and suffering from poor asset allocation and investment choices.
Indeed, exacerbated by myopic choices about retirement withdrawals, the
bulk of the economics literature suggests that many will end up with
inadequate retirement income (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1998, 2008;
Poterba et al. 2007). A notable exception is Scholz, Seshadri, and
Khitatrakun (2006).
So if the prevailing wisdom is correct, it is important to examine whether
the DC model can be modified to make it more effective for the increasing
proportion of covered participants. In the US case, the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 made feasible provisions such as automatic enrollment and
target-date maturity funds to enhance pension sponsors and providers
willingness to boost DC saving. Yet more remains to be done, to make the
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DC model simpler despite the system’s multiple decision points, knowl-
edge requirements, and now well-known participant behavioral tendencies.
In this chapter, we take up two points. First, we ask what simple feedback
can be provided to help participants estimate whether they are on target to
generate adequate retirement income. Second, we explore the right bal-
ance between retirement income adequacy and allowing for individual
choice. We outline our proposed measure, called the asset/salary ratio
(ASR), which we argue offers a robust metric for gauging participant
success. The underlying algorithm for computing the ASR is sophisticated,
and similar to the full funding ratio for a defined benefit (DB) plan, yet the
exercise provides a single number that at any point in time allows the
participant to measure saving adequacy against a set of benchmarks. We
show, using a sample of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association,
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) participants, that certain
individual decisions are particularly important in achieving adequate re-
sources for generating sufficient retirement income. These include, in
order, contribution or saving rates, tenure or length of participation, and
asset allocation. The latter has received considerable attention in the
research literature and among practitioners, but the first two elements
are often downplayed when considering DC pension design.
The ASR
Our goal is to determine whether a plan participant is on track to accumu-
late sufficient assets so as to hit a target income replacement rate (RR) after
retirement. Using reasonable assumptions about future asset returns, fu-
ture contributions, and a retirement income goal (e.g., funding a guaran-
teed income stream), the ASR reflects concepts andmethods widely used to
measure the overall funding status of a DB pension plan. In concept, the
plan’s funding ratio (FR) is defined as
FRt ¼ Assetst
PV Future Liabilitiest
 100 (2.1)
where FR at any point in time equals the plan assets divided by the present
value (PV) of the plan’s future liabilities (Leibowitz et al. 2002). A DB
pension plan’s liabilities are essentially the sum of what it is obligated to
pay individual participants over time in order to replace a certain percent-
age of their preretirement salaries or incomes.1 For any individual partici-
pant, the RR (the percentage of preretirement salary he or she will receive
in retirement) will depend on length of service, size of preretirement salary
or income, and a multiplication factor set by the plan. Theoretically, when
FRt 100, the plan is considered well funded, as long as the investment and
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actuarial assumptions that underlie it continue to be validated by
subsequent experience. In contrast, when FRt < 100, the plan is considered
to be underfunded, in which case the plan sponsor may be required to
make contributions in order to bring the required level of assets up to
match the estimate of discounted future liabilities. In other words, the
funding ratio acts as a signal to the plan sponsor, indicating whether the
plan is on track to meet obligations, or when circumstances have changed
and action is needed. In this sense, the funding ratio serves as an easily
understandable metric for determining whether the plan is on a path to
generate adequate retirement income for the participants.
In addition, the funding ratio has an intertemporal dimension that
reflects changes in current conditions, something we call ‘passage risk.’
Since a pension plan is a long-horizon entity, the risk of a long-term plan
inability to meet its targets (‘outcome risk’) should be of primary concern.
But a sponsor should also be concerned about a sudden drop in market
returns reducing the funding ratio, since this may determine whether the
plan can recover. In this sense, the funding ratio can be used to examine
how the plan fares or ‘passes’ through time.
Similarly, our objective in creating the ASR is to incorporate a target
based on a utility function and a ‘risk passage’ assessment that is easy for an
individual to understand. This is especially important in the DC context
because, in the absence of the plan sponsor taking responsibility for fund-
ing adequacy, DC plan participants can be thought of as being their own
plan sponsors, and therefore they are in charge of managing the risks
associated with maintaining their own retirement solvency. In the spirit of
the DB funding ratio, the ASR can indicate to an individual whether he or
she is ‘on track’ for achieving a personal retirement income goal.
In practice, the challenge for developing an ASR is to ascertain each
individual’s implied future liability stream and to develop assets to meet the
target. But the DC plan sponsor does not typically make a specific pension
income promise (unlike the DB sponsor), so determining the liability
target is difficult. One approach would be to draw on economic life-cycle
theory (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Browning and Crossley 2001), where
the utility of consumption is smoothed across working and retirement
years. Yet analysts have raised questions about how forward-looking house-
holds are or, if they are, to what degree consumption smoothing is compat-
ible with actual behavior (Bullard and Feigenbaum 2007). Nevertheless,
inspired by the life-cycle concept, we can employ as a goal for retirement
saving and investment the RR, which we define here as the proportion of
preretirement income that an individual is able to replace through pur-
chasing a guaranteed annuity at the time of retirement (Heller and King
1989, 1994). The RR is, of course, closely related to the notion of a
DB funding ratio, in that for any individual at the point of retirement,
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retirement income is dependent on salary growth, investment returns,
annuity purchase costs, contribution rates, and length of covered employ-
ment.
In higher education, calibrating an appropriate RR objective might be
done by reference to a policy statement from the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) and American Association of Colleges that
suggests that educational institutions design pension plans that enable
their employees to replace about two-thirds of their preretirement, infla-
tion-adjusted, annual salary through a combination of pension income,
Social Security, and other personal saving (AAUP 2006: 174). This target is
roughly consistent with other research that suggests that retirees aim to
replace 70–80 percent of preretirement income on average (Reno and
Lavery 2007). Therefore, a target RR of 75 percent seems to be a reasonable
objective.
Considering first the Social Security component, one’s individual Social
Security RR is inversely related to preretirement income. Thus, for long-
term labor-force participants, Social Security was calculated to replace
about 40 percent of a $40,000 preretirement income, 35 percent of a
$60,000 income, and about 20 percent of a $120,000 preretirement income
(Reno and Lavery 2007). The higher salary amount is roughly representa-
tive of incomes provided to older faculty in higher education (The Chronicle
of Higher Education 2009). It should be noted that such a replacement rate
assumes people are paid at this rate over their entire lifetimes; in reality,
actual lifetime earnings in higher education are lower earlier on and rise in
later life, making actual Social Security replacement rates somewhat
higher.
In what follows, we make the conservative assumption that Social Security
benefits replace about one-quarter of preretirement income. In this case,
employer-sponsored pensions and other household saving must be capable
of generating a 50 percent RR on average, to meet the 75 percent average
RR standard. We acknowledge that many low-income workers might elect a
lower RR target, while higher income workers might desire a higher RR.
Individuals with substantial personal saving dedicated to retirement could
use those assets to offset required pension saving. For most Americans,
though, non-pension saving tends to be held in relatively illiquid housing,
so it may not be easily accessible as a source of income.
On the presumption that the employer pension must provide a 50 per-
cent replacement rate, it is now necessary to account for other important
factors including contribution rates, years of service, investment earnings,
and salary growth rates. Pulling these together, we have
ASRt ¼ At
St
(2.2)
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which says that the ASR is equal to the level of pension assets divided by the
individual’s annual salary (S) at the point t years before retirement.
There are in fact two variants of the ASR: a worker’s existing ASR at date t,
and what we call the Par ASR, or what is required to achieve a target income
replacement rate. It is worth noting that the required or Par ASR is
dynamic: because of the role of future contributions, the Par ASR must
rise over time in order to arrive at the final ratio of assets to liabilities
needed to fund the required retirement income. If there were to be no
future contributions, then today’s assets must be sufficiently large to fund
a future guaranteed income that will replace the required portion of the
future income. The opportunity to make future contributions, however,
means that today’s assets can be smaller by the amount of the discounted
future value of those contributions and any earnings on those contribu-
tions. So the Par ASR will rise over time by the increase in contributions.2
In any event, if an individual knows his or her current ASR and can
roughly estimate the Par ASR required to fund retirement income years
into the future, then he or she can evaluate whether the current ratio is
adequate for retirement planning purposes. An individual who has an
actual ASR equal to his required Par ASR, all else equal, could be consid-
ered to be on track for retirement adequacy. A person whose ASR is
currently higher than the Par ASR now enjoys a cushion to protect against
unforeseen trends or events (e.g., larger-than-expected stock market de-
clines or better-than-expected retiree life spans). On the other hand,
someone whose ASR is lower than his required ratio should consider
corrective action, including increasing plan contributions, starting to save
in other retirement vehicles, changing investment strategies, and rethink-
ing retirement plans, so as to increase assets and the ASR.
To illustrate these concepts, we display in Figure 2.1 a family of Par ASR
curves for an individual who seeks to remain fully funded (at the Par ASR)
at each age through the retirement date; different RR targets are depicted.
In this figure, we assume an employee seeks to fund a 25-year fixed annuity
at age 65 in 2007. Alternatively, the employee could have funded a lifetime
fixed annuity for about 6 percent less than a comparable 25-year annuity.3
We chose to use the higher-cost option in order to eliminate any differ-
ences in life expectancy among the longest-lived individuals. Therefore,
the ASR threshold calculation used in this chapter is more stringent rela-
tive to a calculation that uses a life annuity assumption.
The figure makes several additional assumptions, including constant
nominal annual salary growth of 4 percent and annual investment returns
of 6 percent. Note that the Par ASR starts close to zero (early in the working
career) and rises to about seven (at the retirement date). Over this period,
both income and assets are rising, but in order to adequately fund a
retirement annuity through a combination of contributions and returns,
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assets must grow faster than salary. Naturally, this example is hypothetical;
next we turn to an examination of whether individuals in the real world
achieve these ratios in practice.
ASR patterns in practice
We examine retirement saving adequacy of a sample drawn from the TIAA-
CREF participant population, namely those covered by institutional DC
plans in 2007 and managed by the TIAA-CREF system. This is a nonprofit
DC retirement system owned by its 3.2 million individual participants, and
it manages over 15,000 tax-deferred plans for employer and employee
contributions and diversified investments. Unlike many 401(k) providers,
TIAA-CREF also offers and encourages lifetime annuities, enables pension
portability, and provides extensive financial education and advice.
From this system, we gathered data on assets, sex, tenure, and contribu-
tion rates for a sample of about 77,000 active employees at 71 institutions
that varied by size, contribution rate, and employer type. We calculated
0
2
4
6
8
10
0510152025303540
AS
R
Years to Retirement
30% RR 40% RR 50% RR
60% RR 70% RR 80% RR
Figure 2.1 Personal funding ratios for 30–80% replacement rate (RR) targets.
Notes : Computations assume 6% asset returns, 25-year annuity at 6%, 4% nominal
salary growth, and 10% contribution rate. Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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ASRs for this sample. We note that the wealth and income figures include
only accumulations inside the TIAA-CREF system, which probably under-
states participants’ total assets and income (especially for participants who
have some other pension, as well as those who hold retirement-related
pensions with other providers). In addition, these data include primary
pension plans, some of which have voluntary features, as well as supple-
mental plans, all of which are voluntary. Participant account balances may
include assets from multiple accounts that may represent jobs at many
different institutions, each of which had different required and voluntary
contribution rates. Specifically, our estimate of contribution rates pertains
only to the current employer. Fortunately, because we have access to
individual plan document information, we have reconstructed employer
match and voluntary plan contribution rates.
As is shown in Table 2.1, the average age of participants in the full sample
is 48 with average tenure (number of years employed) at about 12 years.
The sample is about 51 percent males, 44 percent females, with 5 percent
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics for analysis sample
Unrestricted Restricted
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Age (years) 48.1 11.0 48.6 10.8
Tenure (years) 12.2 9.2 12.8 9.0
Estimated salary ($) 72,107 49,757 73,158 49,992
Total assets ($) 306,577 381,406 321,989 385,227
Asset/salary ratio 2.9 42.8 2.8 10.3
Total contributions 11,854 10,003 12,178 10,111
RA contributionsa
Employer ($) 6,547 4,640 6,836 4,570
Employee ($) 2,821 4,368 2,951 4,443
SRA contributionsb
Employer ($) 45 1,205 48 1,237
Employee ($) 2,260 5,455 2,372 5,570
Contribution as
percent
of salary (%)
16.9 44 16.9 14.1
a Stands for Retirement Account.
b Stands for Supplementary Retirement Account.
Notes : Sample size for unrestricted group is 72,067 (36,372 male, 32,041 female, 3,654 miss-
ing). Sample size for restricted group is 68,373 (36,354 male and 32,019 female).
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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unknown. Average salary stands at about $72,100 and average retirement
assets are about $307,000. In our sample, the average actual ASR we
computed was about 2.9, resulting from employer and/or employee con-
tributions to Retirement Annuity (RA) and/or Supplemental Retirement
Annuity (SRA) accounts. Annual employer contributions averaged about
$6,550 to an RA and $2,900 to an SRA. Participant contributions averaged
about $2,800 and $2,300 to the RA and SRA, respectively. Total contribu-
tions averaged about $11,900, with an average total contribution rate of
about 16.9 percent of salary.
For the analysis sample, we trimmed the data in a few regards. First, we
omitted those with sex not available in the file. Second, we omitted a
handful of participants with extremely high asset levels but very low salary
on the grounds that they are mostly retired. Third, we restricted the sample
to those with salary of at least $5,000. And last, a handful of observations was
omitted due to negative contribution values (because of record-keeping
corrections). The resulting sample of 68,373 participants is described in
the second column of Table 2.1: it is slightly older, higher income, and
wealthier (but not significantly so), and the ASR is less dispersed.
Correlates of ASR
Next we explore the relationship between the ASR and various sample
population characteristics. Table 2.2 shows average ASR by age cohort. As
expected, contributions and income rise with age, since plan rules set
contributions as a percentage of income. In addition, the average ASR
increases with age, suggesting that the decision to delay retirement may
have a strong effect on the ASR. Figure 2.2 provides additional information
Table 2.2 Distribution of mean sample characteristics by age group
Age N Contributions
($)
Assets
($)
Tenure
(years)
Salary
($)
ASRa
<25 320 3,999 6,562 1.8 29,922 0.2
25–34 7,877 6,796 26,506 4.1 48,431 0.6
35–44 17,590 9,791 77,011 8.0 64,625 1.3
45–54 21,589 12,356 180,402 13.2 75,259 2.5
55–64 17,087 15,414 371,162 18.7 85,515 4.5
65–74 3,613 19,096 765,318 25.2 98,842 8.7
75–84 291 21,767 1,216,903 31.5 103,715 18.8
85 6 14,641 1,198,079 21.7 66,636 13.5
a Stands for asset/salary ratio; see text.
Note : Sample size is 68,373.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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on average ASR by age, displaying actual average ASRs along with required
Par ASRs for the 50 and 70 percent target RRs (Par ASRs are similar to
those in Figure 2.1, but have been arrayed by age rather than years to
retirement).
The results show that the entire average ASR curve lies entirely above the
50 percent Par ASR curve, suggesting that, at the end of 2007, this sample
had more assets than needed to be on track for replacing more than 50 per-
cent of its preretirement income. Older participants are doing even better
in providing a cushion for unexpected portfolio shocks. For those aged
61 and above, the actual ASR rises rapidly, and for those above 65 it is
consistently above the 70 percent Par ASR.
Figure 2.3 splits the ASR by age and sex. For younger participants, there
is no significant difference between male and female ASRs. For older
cohorts the results diverge: among baby boomers (those in their mid- to
late 40s or older), females are significantly below males, with ASRs averag-
ing about 75 percent of those for the men. The gap increases substantially
for older cohorts, with females in the oldest cohort having ASRs of
0
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Average ASR Par ASR 50% RR Par ASR 70% RR
Figure 2.2 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR) by age. Note : See Figure 2.1 for defini-
tions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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approximately half those of their male counterparts. Nonetheless, older
women’s ASRs are still consistent with adequate financial resources. In
other words, cohort sex differences in this sample are similar to those of
the population as a whole.
We also identify differences by years of service, or what we call years of
tenure in the TIAA-CREF system. Figure 2.4 shows that, on average, all
participants enjoy ASRs capable of funding an RR of 50 percent or more,
and participants with longer tenure have substantially higher ASRs. Strik-
ingly, those with tenure of 15 years or more have ASRs above the 70 percent
Par ASR curve, reaching ASRs of 10 or more for those with at least 32 years
of service.
Figure 2.5 shows differences by sex and tenure in the system, and once
again, males and females with less tenure have, on average, similar ASRs.
But a comparison of Figures 2.3 and 2.5 shows a smaller tenure–sex differ-
ence than the age–sex divergence. ASRs for males with at least 27 years of
participation are modestly higher than their female counterparts, while a
sharp and persistent tenure–sex distinction only emerges for cohorts with
more than about 36 years of participation.
0
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PAR ASR 70% RR
Figure 2.3 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR) by age and sex. Note : See Figure 2.1 for
definitions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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We want to emphasize that tenure comparisons are complex because
some people have only participated in TIAA-CREF over their entire work-
ing lives, while others might have the same, more, or less total retirement
assets from working job with different plans. Nevertheless, the sex differ-
ences remain interesting: women and men with similar tenures had similar
opportunities to save and invest in the TIAA-CREF system, while women
and men of similar ages might not. For instance, older women are more
likely than men to have spent time out of the higher education labor force
due to family reasons. What is harder to explain is why long-tenure women
and men diverge; different family circumstances may play a role.
Table 2.3 presents information on average ASRs by salary and, as ex-
pected, average ASRs rise with salary, though less sharply than by either age
or tenure. One explanation for this might be faculty salary compression,
with younger faculty receiving starting salaries close to (or on occasion in
excess of) those of their older-tenured colleagues. This effect is suggested
by the tight grouping of average age and average tenure with the various
salary bands. While average ASRs rise slowly with salary, the effect does not
appear to be very strong.
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Figure 2.4 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR) by tenure. Note : See Figure 2.1 for
definitions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Figure 2.5 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR) by tenure and sex. Note : See Figure 2.1
for definitions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
Table 2.3 Distribution of mean sample characteristics by annual salary
Salary ($) N Age
(years)
Contributions
($)
Assets ($) Tenure
(years)
ASR
<40,000 15,473 45 4,738 62,202 8.9 2.8
40,000–59,999 17,158 46 8,183 107,742 10.5 2.1
60,000–79,999 13,974 49 11,625 183,766 13.0 2.6
80,000–99,999 8,663 52 15,395 304,534 15.9 3.4
100,000–119,999 4,741 53 18,851 401,485 17.5 3.7
120,000 8,364 55 27,937 598,758 18.9 3.6
Note : See Table 2.2.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Next we turn to an examination of average ASRs by contribution rates;
Figure 2.6 depicts average ASRs by total contribution rates, and Figure 2.7
decomposes contributions into the basic RA and the SRA. Defining the
total contribution rate as the sum of all employer and employee contribu-
tions divided by salary, we see that the average ASR rises strongly with total
contribution rates, increasing more than five times between the lowest and
highest savers. Even comparing the top two saving groups, the average ASR
is 75 percent higher for the highest savers relative to the next group. It is
interesting that, as with overall contributions, the ASR for RAs and SRAs
rise dramatically with contribution rates. But the SRA effect is particularly
striking: at every level, contributions to the SRA have a greater effect on
average ASR than comparable RA contributions. This is likely due to the
SRA’s role as a supplementary plan, where SRA participation is almost always
conditional on prior or concurrent participation in the basic RA plan.
To summarize, different cuts of the data support the hypothesis that the
average TIAA-CREF participant was ‘on track’ in 2007 for having sufficient
assets to fund a 50 percent RR. This holds for participants of all ages, but
older men seem to have more of a cushion for unexpected shock relative to
older women. Several other factors are correlated with retirement saving
adequacy, including contribution rates, age, tenure, and, to a lesser extent,
salary.
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Figure 2.6 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR)by contribution rate.Note : See Figure 2.1
for definitions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Multivariate analysis of retirement funding adequacy
Next we analyze in a multivariate setting the ways in which ASRs vary across
the sample, both in absolute and deviation terms. For the first set of
models, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to link the depen-
dent variable, the natural log of the ASR (ln (ASR)),4 with a vector of
explanatory variables, including age and age squared, tenure and tenure
squared, sex (female), the natural log of the total contribution rate relative
to salary (ln (TC percent)), the natural log of the proportion of assets held
in equity (ln (Eq percent)) and the natural log of the TIAA traditional
account (ln (TIAA percent)), dummy variables for participant contributions
to a Retirement Annuity (RAemployee) or a Supplemental Retirement
Annuity (SRAemployee), and interacted variables of female with tenure
(tenure * female), and age with SRA contributions (age * SRAemployee).5
One of the strongest findings from the vast prior literature on asset
allocation is that differences in portfolio returns are overwhelmingly
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Figure 2.7 Average asset/salary ratio (ASR) by contribution rate and source. Note :
See Figure 2.1 for definitions. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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determined by differences in portfolio allocations among major asset clas-
ses (Brinson, Hood, and Beebowerr 1986). So it may be that differences in
the ASR could be explained by differences in asset allocation across parti-
cipants. To explore this question, we use both the percent of participant’s
total portfolio invested in equity (ln (Eq percent)) and the percent of total
portfolio invested in the TIAA Traditional Annuity (ln (TIAA percent)),
which is backed by a broadly diversified portfolio of fixed-income assets.
These variables leave out allocations to bond funds and accounts as well to
direct real estate, but in fact, bonds and real estate comprise a small portion
of most participants’ portfolios. We explore whether the ASR might be
affected by employee RA and SRA contributions, separate from employer
contributions. In many cases, and universally so for the SRA, employee
contributions depend on the individual participant decision to save addi-
tional amounts out of salary. While employee contributions are con-
strained by IRS limits and affected by employer matching, in the case of
the RA they can be mandated, while in the case of the SRA they are
completely voluntary. In essence, we are interested in seeing whether
different types of contributions are associated with being on track for a
secure retirement.
Results for ASR levels
Regression results appear in Table 2.4, where we see that the explanatory
variables account for about 82 percent of the variance observed, and all
independent variables except age squared and ln (TIAA percent) are
significant at the 99 percent level (the latter is significant at the 95 percent
level). Estimated elasticities for most variables are relatively small, partly
reflecting the fact that the ASR for the restricted sample averages 2.8 with a
standard deviation of about 10 (see Table 2.1).
It is of interest to note that variations in total contribution rates (ln (TC
percent)) have by far the most important influence on the ASR. This is
sensible, since for younger participants, larger contribution rates should
naturally result in higher assets, while for older participants, the interaction
of lifetime contribution rates and rates of return become important. Both
basic pension plan RA contributions (RAemployee) and voluntary supple-
mental contributions (SRAemployee) have positive effects on the outcome;
also SRA contributions have a much larger impact except for older SRA
contributors. We believe that the negative relationship with age can be
explained by ‘catch-up’ contributions: older participants with low ASRs
have recognized that they are behind target and are more likely to maxi-
mize the RA contributions and to also contribute to their SRAs in an
attempt to catch up with others in their age cohort.
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Tenure is also positively associated with larger ASRs. Going from 0 to 10
years of participation increases ASR by about 1.3, with the tenure effect
reaching a maximum at about 38 years of service. Evidently participating
for a long time in an institution’s plan is a good way to build a healthy
retirement nest egg. Interestingly, the female effect is small and positive,
while the longer-tenured female effect is small but negative. We surmise
that this is due to the increased probability that females had work stoppages
in their past careers, leading to lower lifetime contribution rates and hence
lower ASRs. We also find that for this population, having a high equity
share (ln (Eq percent)) is associated with higher ASRs; whether this will
hold in the future is uncertain.
Table 2.4 Multivariate OLS regression analysis of asset/salary ratio (ASR):
dependent variable ln (asset/salary ratio)
Variable Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
t value Probability > jtj
Intercept 0.158 0.044 3.59 0.0003
Age 0.012 0.002 6.48 <.0001
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.65 0.5153
Tenure 0.153 0.001 161.31 <.0001
Tenure squared 0.002 0.000 81.12 <.0001
Female 0.031 0.008 4.15 <.0001
ln (TC percent)a 0.748 0.005 142.36 <.0001
ln (Eq percent)b 0.051 0.003 16.55 <.0001
ln (TIAA percent)c 0.007 0.002 2.79 0.0052
RAemployee 0.076 0.005 15.97 <.0001
SRAemployee 0.254 0.022 11.49 <.0001
Tenure * female 0.003 0.000 6.89 <.0001
Age * SRAemployee 0.006 0.000 14.83 <.0001
Root MSE 0.44
Dependent mean 0.60
Coefficient of
Variance
73.67
R-square 0.83
Adjusted R-square 0.83
a Stands for the natural log of the total contribution rate relative to salary.
b Stands for the natural log of the proportion of assets held in equity.
c Stands for the natural log of the TIAA traditional account.
Note : See Table 2.2.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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In sum, individual participants who participated longer, saved more, and
allocated more to equities enjoy higher ASRs than those who did not. While
this may seem relatively unsurprising, this simple formulation explains over
80 percent of the variation in the ASR for our sample of TIAA-CREF
participants.
Results on deviations from the Par ASR
Next we assess what influences observed deviations from the Par ASR,
which we think of as the ‘on-track’ or ‘target’ ASR. To this end, we measure
the tracking error around the Par ASR by defining ASRs over five threshold
ranges: those with an ASR greater than or equal to 80 percent, 70 to less
than 80 percent, 60 to less than 70 percent, 50 to less than 60 percent, and
less than 50 percent. As before, the sample includes only participants aged
25 to 75, with 48,788 usable observations.
Table 2.5 presents the results of an ordered probit regression with the
target Par ASR (Threshold ASR) as the dependent variable; the same
independent variables used earlier are employed. Results indicate that all
variables are highly statistically significant and all coefficients but age have
coefficients with similar magnitudes and signs. As before, contribution
rates and tenure have the largest effect on participants’ likelihood of
moving up into the next highest ASR threshold. The overall contribution
rate has the largest effect, with employee contributions to an RA or SRA
increasing the probability that a participant will reach the higher thresh-
old. As before, the exception is for the interaction of SRA with age,
suggesting that older participants making SRA contributions are playing
catch-up with their retirement saving.
One important difference with the prior results is that here the coeffi-
cient on age is negative. This is because the proportion of individuals in the
lower ASR thresholds starts low for young cohorts, rises for middle-aged
cohorts, and then falls for older cohorts, a pattern perhaps attributable to
student loan debt, child rearing, and home purchases early on, which do
not persist into late middle-age but may crowd out retirement saving.
Tenure increases the probability that a participant crosses into the next
higher threshold. As before, longer-tenured females are less likely to cross
into higher thresholds, perhaps because they did not contribute at the
same rate as men over time. As before, the asset allocationmix is important,
with higher equity fractions boosting the likelihood of achieving the next
threshold. Likewise, fixed income (ln (TIAA percent)) is also significant,
slightly increasing the likelihood of reaching the next threshold. Neverthe-
less, the effect of asset allocation proves rather small, relative to the impact
of contributions and tenure. Themain implication is that chasing returns is
no substitute for adequately funding a retirement plan over time.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/8/2010, SPi
Asset/Salary Ratio 29
Conclusion
We use the ASR to highlight factors associated with retirement saving
adequacy in a large DC pension system. On average, our sample partici-
pants in a range of TIAA-CREF plans appear to be on track for funding a
fixed retirement annuity that, with Social Security, will replace at least 70
percent of preretirement income. Furthermore, many appear able to do
better, buying themselves higher replacement rates or having a significant
cushion against economic shocks. Factors most predictive of success are
contribution rate, years of participation in the system, and the fraction of
equities in the retirement portfolio. Also those employees who contributed
to their SRAs had substantially greater chances of meeting ASR targets.
One caveat to this analysis is that our dataset was collected in 2007, when
equity markets were near all-time highs and many other assets, including
bonds, real estate, and other alternatives were providing solid returns.
In 2008 and 2009, financial markets were highly volatile; equity markets
Table 2.5 Multivariate ordered probit analysis of threshold asset/salary ratio
(ASR): dependent variable threshold ASR
Variable Parameter
estimate
Standard error Chi-square Probability >
chi-square
Intercept 1 11.092 0.131 7,202.3 <.0001
Intercept 2 0.629 0.008 6,187.0 <.0001
Intercept 3 1.480 0.011 19,365.9 <.0001
Intercept 4 2.522 0.013 37,857.4 <.0001
Age 0.411 0.006 5,513.5 <.0001
Age squared 0.003 0.000 2,455.9 <.0001
Tenure 0.286 0.003 7,826.1 <.0001
Tenure squared 0.002 0.000 850.4 <.0001
Female 0.091 0.022 17.4 <.0001
ln (TC percent) 1.658 0.017 9,909.0 <.0001
ln (Eq percent) 0.156 0.008 347.3 <.0001
ln (TIAA percent) 0.038 0.006 37.1 <.0001
RAemployee 0.180 0.013 189.9 <.0001
SRAemployee 0.290 0.057 25.7 <.0001
Tenure * female 0.009 0.001 42.6 <.0001
Age * SRAemployee 0.008 0.001 49.2 <.0001
Log likelihood 50,951
Note : See Tables 2.2 and 2.4.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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dropped by more than half and then rose again by about 60 percent
through the end of 2009. Looking only at the period of decline from the
beginning of 2008 through February 2009, aggregate TIAA-CREF assets lost
roughly 17 percent of their value (equity losses were tempered by invest-
ments in a guaranteed account and fixed income). We estimate that, if the
average sample participant lost 17 percent, his or her ASR would have
declined by a similar proportion. An average participant with 30 years
tenure would have had an ASR of 8 at year-end 2007, consistent with a
Par ASR of over 100 percent RR. This 17 percent decline in assets would
have left that hypothetical participant with an ASR of over 6.6, still well
above the 70 percent ASR. Recall that our PAR ASRs assume a constant
annual 6 percent investment return from a diversified portfolio of assets. At
the end of 2007, the average TIAA-CREF participant’s portfolio consisted of
about 52 percent equities, 39 percent guaranteed and fixed income, 5 per-
cent direct real estate, and 4 percent money market assets. Over the last 10
years (through the end of September 2009), a portfolio constantly main-
tained at these asset allocations would have returned about 3.1 percent per
year, about half of the assumed total rate of return. A steady 3 percent rate of
return would place a considerable burden on participants saving for retire-
ment. One way to look at this is that the required ASR 15 years before
retirement would rise from 3.5 times salary using the 6 percent return
assumption to 5.8 times salary using a 3 percent return assumption, an
increase ofmore than 65 percent. Another way to look at it is that a sustained
multi-decade period of subpar returns would leave many participants
unable to fund their target replacement incomes in retirement. In order
to explore these and other issues, we intend to track what actually happened
to TIAA-CREF participants in future work.
We would note that many other DC plans are less generous than most
TIAA-CREF plans, so participants and policymakers must not be overly
sanguine regarding these results. For instance, contribution rates across
the private sector plan universe range from 6 to 8 percent of salary, rather
than the 10 to 20 percent seen in many TIAA-CREF plans. Furthermore,
high contribution rates are a key determinant of being able to hit one’s Par
ASR as we have shown. And even in our sample, employees contributing
less than 10 percent had average ASRs of 1.0, far less than the number
needed to fund an adequate retirement income. Another feature of many
401(k) plans is people have shorter plan tenure; private sector 401(k) plans
have only existed since the early 1980s and did not achieve deep market
penetration until the mid-1990s. By contrast, TIAA-CREF has been in
existence for over 90 years.
In sum, we have shown that it is possible to design robust DC plans that
considerably increase the likelihood of achieving sufficient saving for gen-
erating adequate retirement income. We believe that our proposed mea-
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sure, the ASR, can help individuals do a better job setting saving goals as
well as gauge whether they are on track for retirement in a dynamic way. All
too often, workers lack incentives or feedback mechanisms they can use to
judge their progress to a goal. Providing interim and easily understandable
feedback could be useful in helping participants link future goals to cur-
rent conditions and make adjustments as necessary.
Appendix 2A More Detail on the ASR6
We define the ASR as the ratio of current retirement assets (A) to current
salary (S) at time t years before retirement:
ASRt ¼ At
St
(2A.1)
where S is the salary earned over the previous year. In the chapter, we
explain two different versions of this measure. Without any future contri-
butions (i.e., pension premiums) beyond the current moment, the required
current level of assets or initial principal would be equal to the discounted
present value of the cost of an annuity at retirement divided by future salary
growth:
At ðNo contributionsÞ ¼ FVAð1þ rÞt (2A.2)
where FVA is the discounted present value of the cost of an annuity at
retirement that would be sufficient to produce the desired RR, and r is the
rate of investment return on the existing assets. If we allow positive future
pension contributions and other incremental saving, then required cur-
rent assets is reduced accordingly to
At ðWith contributionsÞ ¼ FVA  FVPð1þ rÞt (2A.3)
where FVP is the accumulated value of annual premium payments (and any
other retirement saving) at retirement. These in turn depend on initial
salary, salary growth, and investment return on premiums such that
FVp ¼
Xt
n¼1
PSt ð1þ wÞn1ð1þ rÞtn (2A.4)
and w ¼ nominal salary increase rate, including a real salary increase and
an inflation component.
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Substituting Equation (2A.4) into Equation (2A.3), the required assets
size becomes
At ¼
FVA 
Xt
n¼1PSt ð1þ wÞ
n1ð1þ rÞnt
ð1þ rÞt (2A.5)
Now the future value of an annuity can be recast in terms of the RR, salary,
salary growth, and an annuity purchase cost:
FVA ¼ ½ St ð1þ wÞt RR AC (2A.6)
where
AC ¼
1 1ð1þrANÞK
 h i
rAN
rAN ¼ investment rate of return on annuity assets
K ¼ total number of years in the annuity
RR ¼ income replacement rate
Substituting Equation (2A.6) into Equation (2A.5) yields
At ¼ Stð1þ rÞt ½½RRð1þ wÞ
tAC 
Xt
n¼1
Pð1þ wÞn1ð1þ rÞtn (2A.7)
Simplifying further yields the expression
At
St
¼ RRð1þ wÞ
tAC
ð1þ rÞt 
Pð1þ wÞ½ð1þ rÞt  ð1þ wÞt 
ðr  wÞð1þ rÞt (2A.8)
or
ASRt ¼ At
St
¼ RR  AC 1þ w
1þ r
 t
 Pð1þ wÞ
r  w 1
1þ w
1þ r
 t 
(2A.9)
Two things should be noted about this characterization of the ASR. First,
the annuity value is based on a date certain rather than a life annuity. If a
life annuity is used, then the annuity cost (AC) depends on the annuity’s
interest rate, i, the probability of a person’s age b at retirement of living to
age b þ h (hPb), and on the last age in a mortality table, m, as follows:
ACb ¼
Xmb
h¼0
hPb
ð1þ iÞh (2A.10)
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Second, the preretirement investment return, annuity investment return,
and salary growth terms may all be different. If any of them are similar, the
ASR equation is further simplified. For example, if the preretirement
investment rate of return and the salary growth rate are equal, then
ASRt ¼ At
St
¼ RR  AC P  t (2A.11)
Notes
1 For present purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that several different approaches
may be taken to compute DB funding ratios, some of which depend on how plan
liabilities are defined. For example, liabilities may be defined as though the plan
were to close today, with the need to pay all currently accrued liabilities but no
future liability buildup would be booked. Alternatively, they can be defined to
include an estimate of the buildup in future liabilities (including assumptions
about how long employees will continue to work, what they will get paid, etc.). For
further detail, see McGill et al. (2005).
2 The Appendix 2A provides a detailed description of the mathematical relation-
ships among the elements that make up the required Par ASR: the desired
income replacement rate (RR), pension contribution rate, investment rate of
return on pension contributions, salary growth rate, investment rate of return on
annuity assets, and the respective number of years remaining prior to and follow-
ing retirement.
3 The 25-year fixed annuity is actually more expensive than a life annuity because it
does not fully leverage pooled mortality risk the way a life annuity does. Under
our assumptions, it is about 6 percent more expensive to buy the 25-year fixed
annuity than the pure life annuity beginning at age 65.
4 The OLS models eliminate cases where the ASR was over 50 on the grounds that
there might be measurement errors or temporarily low incomes reported in our
sample snapshot. We also exclude individuals over the age of 75 and under the age
of 25. The resulting sample has 67,324 observations.
5 Because of zero values for some percentages, only 48,778 observations are used in
the final regression.
6 This appendix is derived from Leibowitz et al. (2002).
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